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Introduction: In recent time there has been ample discussion concerning censorship of research conducted in two
labs involved in avian influenza virus research. Much of the debate has centered on the question whether the
methods and results should reach to open disclosure given the “dual use” nature of this research which can be
used for nefarious purposes.
Methods: This paper reviews the discussion to date but centers on epistemological issues associated with initial
justification of this research and what this entails for continuation of this research despite US governmental
biosecurity concerns. The question here is whether there was reasonable moral warrant for genetic alteration of the
H5N1 influenza virus.
Conclusion: The paper concludes with philosophical (ethical) justification for continuation of this research.
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The ethical question at issue
The year 2011 ended with significant concern about pro-
spective publication of troubling results of research on a
strain of H5N1 avian influenza virus, such that reputable
scientists characterized the scene of disputation as one
of “life sciences at a crossroads.” Even The New York
Times published an editorial warning of impending cata-
strophic harm, “an engineered doomsday” [1,2]. Both
Nature and Science journals were initially faced with an
extraordinary editorial decision, following a request from
the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
(NSABB) to restrict disclosure of the details of two ex-
periments from two research teams (Fouchier, Kawaoka,
as described below), based on NSABB’s review of the ini-
tial papers submitted. The U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services concurred with the recommenda-
tion. The request was unprecedented in the annals of
scientific research. NSABB was concerned specifically
with one possibility: “Could this knowledge, in the hands
of malevolent individuals, organizations, or governments,
allow construction of a genetically altered influenza virusCorrespondence: nswazo@alfaisal.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orcapable of causing a pandemic with mortality exceeding
that of the ‘Spanish flu’ epidemic of 1918?” [3].
The norm of open publication of research, of course,
allows access to the experimental methods and prospect-
ive replication of research results, consistent with peer
review and international advancement of the particular
research agenda. The initial NSABB request would re-
strict such open publication. According to NSABB’s ini-
tial risk assessment in this case, “the potential risk of
public harm [is] of unusually high magnitude” [3]. The
question being asked initially was whether the journals
should defer to the NSABB and effectively redact
submitted papers to satisfy the biosecurity concerns.
Perhaps equally as important, the controversy over pub-
lication suffered from relevant legal oversight mecha-
nisms, even though “the international scale of such
research brings international law into the picture” [4].
The question about full or redacted publication is, of
course, important to ask from the perspective of national
(and even “global”) biosecurity policy. This policy al-
ready presupposes the legitimacy of dual use research,
hence the NSABB institutional oversight in this case.
Further, such policy also presupposes adequate biosafety
measures in place in laboratory settings, to prevent or
mitigate biologic threats to the national public health
and/or national security—not to mention threats tohis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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bial agents that could be weaponized or released inad-
vertently into the environment. But, in present case
there is at least one prior, more fundamental, question
to be asked. This is not an empirical question, in the
sense that one may be concerned with the success or
failure of the particular research methods in use or the
outcomes of this research for translational medicine,
e.g., production of a vaccine or antivirals. Neither is it a
question about restrictions on publication such as both
Nature and Science editors have faced. Rather, the more
fundamental question is normative, and it is grounded
in the conventions of biomedical research ethics. The
key question then is:
Is there moral warrant in place reasonably to permit
genetic alteration of the H5N1 strain of avian
influenza for the purposes presented in the research
protocol?
This is the question engaged in the following discus-
sion. This paper thus contributes to the NSABB call for
a broad and international engagement of the issues
raised by the Fouchier and Kawaoka experiments.Results and discussion
Summarizing the debate
Two studies were involved, one from a research team
led by virologist Ron Fouchier at the Erasmus Medical
Center in Rotterdam, Netherlands, involving genetic en-
gineering of H5N1; the other led by virologist Yoshihiro
Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison School
of Veterinary Medicine (Institute for Influenza Viral Re-
search) and the University of Tokyo (Institute of Medical
Science), this research involving H5N1-H1N1 reas-
sortment. Both studies are sub-contracts for a National
Institute of Health/National Institute for Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIH-NIAID) grant award that es-
tablished an NIAID Center of Excellence for Influenza
Research and Surveillance (CEIRS), specifically a Center
for Research on Influenza Pathogenesis (CRIP) at Mt.
Sinai School of Medicine (Research Area: Pathogenesis
and Host Response Research; Principal Investigator:
Adolfo Garcia-Sastre).
These two experiments succeeded in genetically alter-
ing H5N1, with the effect in the Fouchier experiment of
aerosol (airborne) transmission of the mutated virus in
ferretsa. It is claimed that ferrets provide an animal
model most similar to humans for study of H5N1 dis-
ease transmission. Airborne transmission is not now a
natural occurrence for H5N1 incidence in humans.
Hence, the chief public health and “biosecurity” concern
consequent to this research is inadvertent release of a“man-made virus” into the environment, and thus a pro-
spective pandemic having high human mortality.
Berns et. al. report that the Fouchier experiment
exhibited transmission “with maintenance of high patho-
genicity” [3]. However, Fouchier emphasized his experi-
ment is not reasonably to be construed as a quantitative
model for transmission—i.e., while the experiment has
indeed shown aerosol transmission, the efficiency of
transmission cannot be deduced from the experiment’s
results. (Personal notes, web-link access to AMS presen-
tation; see reference [5]). This point is important further
in clarifying misperceptions reported in the public press
about the degree of pathogenicity of the H5N1 mutation.
In a comparison of virus titer of pH1N1 [pandemic
H1N1] and the mutated form of H5N1 over 1–5 days of
infection, Fouchier reports, the pH1N1 shows massive
replication after inoculation exposure as early as Day 1
in the recipient ferret, and generally all ferrets start to
shed virus in high amounts by Day 2 (Personal notes,
web-link access to AMS presentation; see reference [5]).
Fouchier argued that, in contrast to the pH1N1 data:
H5N1 does not transmit in 100% of the cases; virus ti-
ters are much lower; many of the ferrets do not start
shedding virus until Day 3 or 5; and therefore, the H5N1
mutation does not spread like pH1N1 or seasonal influ-
enza. Moreover, the pathogenicity of the mutated H5N1
varies: When the dose of H5N1-Wt (wild type) virus is
at 106 and the inoculation route is intranasal, 1 out
of 8 ferrets was dead or moribund by 6 days post-
exposure; when H5N1-Mut transmission is by aerosol,
0 out of 7 ferrets are dead or moribund; but, when
the H5N1-Mut inoculation route is intratracheal, 6
out of 6 ferrets were dead or moribund by day 3
post-exposure. Fouchier stressed further that when
ferrets have been pre-exposed to seasonal flu there is
no lethality at 106 dose—that is, the pre-exposure provides
cross-protective immunity.
Some NSABB infectious disease specialists are not sat-
isfied Fouchier’s remarks alter the risk-benefit assess-
ment, given both the changed host range and changed
mode of transmission of H5N1-Mut [6]. H5N1 is of par-
ticular concern because a strain of H5N1 avian-origin
virus adapted to humans and caused the 1918–1919
pandemic with an estimated 40–50 million deaths world-
wide [7]. The adaptations of such viruses occur “gradually
by point mutation (antigenic drift) or drastically by genetic
reassortment (antigenic shift)” [8]. Further, avian influenza
is particularly problematic for the agricultural sector of
the economy. In Pennsylvania USA, e.g., eradication
of an avirulent H5N2 influenza virus in chickens re-
quired “destruction of over 17 million birds at a cost
of over 61 million dollars” [8,9]. In the case of the
Hong Kong outbreak of H5N1, the costs are esti-
mated in the US$100s millions, with the global loss
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2003 [10,11].
Epidemiological data for H5N1 are in dispute, even as
some argue the dispute centers on “the wrong questions”
[12]. Some data show H5N1 has a “high virulence in
both avian and mammalian species,” having been trans-
mitted “from birds in live poultry markets in Hong Kong
to humans,” with corresponding high mortality rate in
those humans infected when it surfaced in 1997 [8,13].
The virus has exhibited sporadic occurrence in humans
in the intervening period, but with an estimated 60%
case fatality rate, although infection in humans is rare
given the current mode of transmission [7,14].
Fouchier et. al., report that, as of January 2012, “HPAI
H5N1 virus caused 577 laboratory-confirmed human
cases of infection, of which 340 were fatal,” although
“sustained human-to-human transmission has not been
reported” [15]. Peter Palese argues that the case fatality
ratio estimate is “too high, because only severe [hospital]
cases are being counted;” and “People who are asymp-
tomatically infected are not being counted” [16]. In
short, argue Wang et. al., “The prevalence of avian
H5N1 influenza A infections in humans has not been
definitively determined,” although the claim here is that
the likely infection rate in exposed populations is 1-2%,
H5N1 thereby having a much lower case-fatality ratio
than estimated by WHO [17,18]. This latter claim, how-
ever, is itself countered by Osterholm and Kelley, given
that “case-finding strategies may influence the overall
case-fatality rate reported by the WHO;” but they argue
that the “available seroepidemiological data for H5N1 in-
fection support the current WHO-reported case-fatality
rates of 30% to 80%” [19].
Despite the above observations, NSABB provided a
utilitarian argument with a view to maximizing benefits
and minimizing risk: “Because the NSABB found that
there was significant potential for harm in fully publish-
ing these results and that the harm exceeded the benefits
of publication, we therefore recommended that the work
not be fully communicated in an open forum” [3].
NSABB also gave priority appeal to non-maleficence over
beneficence in evaluating researcher responsibilities,
even as they pointed to the need for prudence in this
case. While Paul Keim, acting chair of NSABB, acknow-
ledged bioterrorist uses of this modified virus are of “low
probability,” he is nonetheless concerned that a terrorist
“could introduce a new evolutionary seed into the envi-
ronment that seems not to exist in nature. This might
not cause a pandemic instantly, but it could start the
virus on a new path for pandemic evolution” [20-23].
Keim compared H5N1 with H1N1, which caused a
low-virulence influenza pandemic in 2009, noting that
the latter “was impossible to contain,” and asserted “the
same would be true for an H5N1 influenza pandemic,”this one of more concern because of its high virulence.
Keim’s concerns are not without scientific grounding,
given what has been learned from the 1918 influenza
strain genetic analyses. Taubenberger et. al. take note of
“amino acid changes identified in the 1918 analysis” that
are “also seen in HPAI strains of H5N1…viruses;” and
they opine that, (1) “these changes may facilitate virus
replication in human cells and increase pathogenicity;”
(2) “the high pathogenicity of the 1918 virus was related
to its emergence as a human-adapted avian influenza
virus;” and (3) “the 1918 virus was most likely not a hu-
man/avian reassortment virus, but rather an avian-like
virus that adapted to humans in toto” [24].
The editor-in-chief of Science issued a statement sum-
marizing the initial NSABB request [25]. In tension here
is (a) “the need to know” normally asserted and expected
by scientists engaged in responsible influenza research,
for the purpose of disease control and prevention; and
(b) the prospect of dual-use research of concern (DURC)
having deleterious “biosecurity” consequences in the
event someone decides to weaponize the H5N1 virus
consequent to knowledge of the methods of genetic al-
teration. Consequent to the NSABB request, Fouchier
and Kawaoka implemented a “voluntary pause of 60 days”
of their research activities [26,27]. One additional conse-
quence of this research publication impasse is that the
U.S. National Security Council has sought “greater federal
control” over such studies [28]. On 29 March 2012, the
US government issued a new policy for oversight of life
sciences “dual use research of concern” (DURC) [29]. The
U.S. Office of Biotechnology defines “dual use” research as
“biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that
may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health
and/or national security” [30]. After much international
discussion and a second round of NSABB review of re-
vised manuscripts, at a meeting held on 29–30 March
2012, NSABB voted unanimously to recommend full pub-
lication of the revised Kawaoka paper and voted 12–6 to
recommend full publication of the revised Fouchier paper
[31]. These recommendations were forwarded to the De-
partment of Health and Human Services for final deter-
mination. Kawaoka et. al. published their unredacted
version of the paper in early May 2012 [32]. Fouchier’s
team published in June 2012 [33].
As bioethicists know, the moral question at issue here
can be engaged according to various theoretical frame-
works of moral analysis that unavoidably combine both
the empirical data and moral principles and methods
that guide normative assessment. The fact is—or so it
seems from information available to the public at large—
that the question of moral warrant posed above had not
been asked in these particular research projects prior to
the fact, though it was raised once the issue of publica-
tion of results came to the fore [34,35]. This is surely
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hence the need for the analysis engaged here. Moreover,
the entire debate about open disclosure of the research
methods associated with the two experiments, even if
disclosure were to be restricted to those authorized on
criteria of “need to know,” presupposes opportunity for
replication of the research and the usual “falsification/
verification” of the Fouchier and Kawaoka results, in
which case the moral question above has even further
urgency: If the warrant for the original experiments is
lacking, then a fortiori so is the warrant for consequent
experiments very likely to be wanting. Hans-Jörg Ehni
wrote in 2008, “In the beginning of the 21st century, the
technology which raises the most concern is the genetic
construction and reconstruction of pathogenic organisms
and viruses by biotechnological means” [36]. H5N1 re-
search now raises this concern fully, whatever the risk/
benefit calculation issued at any given time.
Applicable biosafety protocol
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention has
established technical guidelines for such research [37].
The operative term is containment, involving “safe me-
thods, facilities and equipment for managing infectious
materials in the laboratory environment where they are
being handled or maintained” [37]. Such methods, fa-
cilities, and equipment are to assure appropriate risk as-
sessment, ‘risk’ here understood to mean “exposure” to
“potentially hazardous agents.” Risk is mitigated—
reduced or eliminated—through the controls on expos-
ure. These controls are specified according to various
biosafety levels (Class 1, 2, and 3). Class 3 biological
safety “provides the highest attainable level of protection
to personnel and the environment” [37]. Biosafety levels
also incorporate various specifications of “primary bar-
riers” and “personal protective equipment” (e.g., con-
tainers, safety cabinets, gas-tight safety cabinets, full-body
air-supplied positive-pressure personnel suits, clothing
change protocols) and “secondary barriers” obtained
through “facility design and construction” (e.g., controlled
access, decontamination facility, specialized ventilation,
airlocks and air treatment). There are also recommended
biosafety levels set for particular microbial agents being
handled, consistent with known data about “virulence,
pathogenicity, antibiotic resistance patterns, vaccine and
treatment availability.”
We are informed that the two research projects at
issue here were conducted under Biosafety Level-3 stan-
dards. Fouchier’s research facility has the requisite for-
mal approvals for the virus research being conducted
there, including a permit from the Dutch government
(2007) and U.S. Center for Disease Control (2007) ap-
provals of the security infrastructure of the laboratory.
Further, the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIAID)has funded Fouchier’s research with a seven-year commit-
ment (sub-contract with Mt. Sinai School of Medicine
awarded 2005, consequent to an NIH-NIAID-DMID-07-
20 call for proposals). Fouchier’s facility includes use of
in vitro class 3 biosafety cabinets and in vivo class 3 isola-
tor units for the research on ferrets. (Personal notes, web-
link access to AMS presentation; see reference [38]).
Kawaoka’s facility is designated BSL3-Ag (Biosafety
Level 3-Agriculture), which, according to U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) standards, requires in-
ventory control procedures, physical security systems,
cybersecurity systems, personnel suitability, a biosecurity
incident response plan, and ongoing federal oversight—
standards deemed essential for zoonotic pathogens
(causing disease in both animals and humans), avian in-
fluenza virus included as a pathogen of “high conse-
quence” (HCP) [39]. BSL3-Ag requires “adding filtration
of supply and exhaust air, sewage decontamination, exit
personnel showers, and facility integrity testing” to re-
duce “the risk of environmental exposure to pathogens
of consequence to agriculture.” According to the CDC
designation, the BSL-3 level of containment is “applic-
able to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or produc-
tion facilities in which work is done with indigenous or
exotic agents with a potential for respiratory transmis-
sion, and which may cause serious and potentially lethal
infection” [37]. The principal investigators, seeking to
provide assurance to the public, are aware of “a per-
ceived fear that the ferret-transmissible H5HA viruses
may escape from the laboratories;” but they note that
“these experiments have been conducted with appropri-
ate regulatory oversight in secure containment facilities
by highly trained and responsible personnel to minimize
any risk of accidental release” (Personal notes, web-link
access to AMS presentation; see reference [38]). They
concede further that, “Whether the ferret-adapted influ-
enza viruses have the ability to transmit from human to
human cannot be tested.”
Some critics of the H5N1 research have argued that
any continuation of the research should occur, as a mat-
ter of prudence and in view of some regularity of “lab
accidents”, only in a BSL-4 level facility [40]. Imperiale
and Hanna reconfigure the issue by considering whether
making the H5N1 virus transmissible among mammals
changes “its biosafety profile” [41]. Appealing to the
precautionary principle, they argue for moving such
research to BSL4 containment. Others caution against
such a move because “BSL4 facilities are few in number
and already engaged in research with numerous other
pathogens” [42]. It is argued further that such a move
would “make society potentially more vulnerable, since
critical experimental work will not get done…,” thereby
affecting influenza preparedness negatively as well as re-
ducing opportunities for pharmaceutical companies to
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principal investigator for the NIH/NIAID research award
sub-contracted to both Kawaoka and Fouchier, accounts
for the fact that the Kawaoka and Fouchier experimental
results have now ruled out a hypothesis widely held by
influenza virologists, viz., that “H5N1 viruses might be
structurally unfit for mammalian transmission” [43].
Given the need for continued research on “molecular
mechanisms responsible for host specificity” such re-
search, he argues, can be safely performed as now with
BSL3 facilities.
Vincent Racaniello, (Professor of Microbiology and
Immunology, Columbia University College of Physicians
and Surgeons), objected to the initial NSABB assess-
ment, finding the argument faulty for its assumption
that experimental results in ferrets predict what may
occur in humans [44]. He reminds that the reduction of
virus virulence in humans occurs through passage of vi-
ruses in a different host. For example, “The infectious,
attenuated yellow-fever virus and the poliovirus vaccines
have been produced in this way. So, the possibility exists
that passage of the H5N1 virus in ferrets will attenuate
its virulence in humans, a possibility not considered by
the advisory board.” Moreover, Racaniello complained of
scientific hubris in predictive claims of critics of this re-
search. Such engineered viruses, he argues, are not sub-
ject to the strong selection pressures, thus a natural
process cannot be expected to be reproducible in the la-
boratory. Indeed, Horimoto and Kawaoka have com-
mented that these viruses lack efficient replication in
humans, meaning then that direct transmission of such
viruses to humans would be “a rare event,” although
there are some isolated incidents that argue against this
[8]. Further, the authors hypothesized that, “Most prob-
ably, additional mutations introduced through continued
replication in humans or perhaps reassortment with a
currently circulating human virus will be required to
produce a highly virulent and contagious virus” [8].
Influenza is among the viral diseases listed by the
CDC in relation to biosafety standards [37]. Influenza is
associated with epidemic disease frequency and can have
high mortality rates, depending on the strain, with pan-
demic presence due to “reassortment of human and
avian influenza virus genes,” i.e., mutation. Avian influ-
enza represents one antigenic subtype that occurs natur-
ally in wild avian species and domestic fowl. It is known
that, “The human influenza viruses responsible for the
1918, 1957, and 1968 pandemics contained gene seg-
ments closely related to those avian influenza viruses”
[37]. In its containment recommendations, CDC iden-
tifies the “primary laboratory hazard” as “inhalation of
virus from aerosols generated by infecting animals or by
aspirating, dispensing, mixing, centrifuging or other-
wise manipulating virus-infected samples” [37]. Further,“genetic manipulation has the potential for altering the
host range, pathogenicity, and antigenic composition of
influenza viruses.” Biosafety level 2 is recommended for
“low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) strains,” while
“highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)” research is
expected to follow Biosafety Level 3 protocol [37]. The
USDA stipulates BSL-4 as the highest category of bio-
security facility, “applicable for work with dangerous and
exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of life-
threatening disease, which may be transmitted via the
aerosol route and for which there is no available vaccine
or therapy.”
Thus, under regulations currently in place in the USA
and the Netherlands where the H5N1 research is being
done, both research teams are compliant with contain-
ment standards.Research justifications and objections
According to Anthony Fauci, NIH/NIAID influenza
research funding increased substantially from US$196
million in FY2006 to US$261 million in FY2007, conse-
quent to heightened concern for both host adaptation
and transmissibility of pandemic influenza viruses and
the H5N1 threat in particular. (Personal notes, web-link
access to AMS presentation; see reference [45]). The
Fouchier and Kawaoka research engage both of these
NIH/NIAID public health concerns, consistent further
with the NIAID Influenza Blue Ribbon Panel (2006) and
the World Health Organization (WHO) Research Agen-
da for Influenza (2009). Thus, on research initiation it
was understood, by all concerned with protocol review
and approvals, that the two research protocols were (a)
properly situated within, and (b) technically undertaken
consistent with, both a national (USA, Netherlands) and
internationally recognized (WHO, CDC) influenza re-
search framework.
The WHO expressed concern about the two experi-
ments, but expected such studies could proceed under
appropriate conditions, on the grounds that “critical sci-
entific knowledge needed to reduce the risks posed by
the H5N1 virus continues to increase” [46]. As noted
above, public health officials are particularly concerned
about H5N1 adaptation through antigenic variation,
hence the annual pressure for new vaccines. Notwith-
standing, the WHO cautioned about this research being
done only after accounting for public health risks/bene-
fits. Also, this research should not in any way undermine
the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework
put in place in May 2011. In light of the pressures for
redaction of the Kawaoka and Fouchier submitted
manuscripts, on 17–18 February 2012, a WHO-convened
panel of influenza experts recommended “full disclosure,”
with some delay, with the additional recommendation to
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laboratory-modified H5N1 viruses [47].
Risk reduction in this case includes not only what pre-
cautions are taken in laboratory infrastructure during
the research endeavor, but also risk reduction in terms
of the larger concern for national and global response
preparedness in the event of a pandemic. The U.S.
NIAID, for example, comments on influenza with refer-
ence to the techniques of “plasmid-based reverse genet-
ics,” developed by Kawaoka [48]. Researchers believe
this technique of reverse genetics can provide a vaccine
sooner than what other methods allow, including for
H5N1 influenza, because of assembly of genes with cod-
ing for desired features. Kawaoka believes this technique
provides a way to “determine the pathogenic potential of
a virus or its ability to cross the species barrier,” since
the methods “allow the generation of an influenza virus
entirely from cloned cDNAs” [49]. Further, Kawaoka ar-
gues that reverse-genetics vaccines have already been pre-
pared according to World Health Organization (WHO)
recommendations; in fact, there is already ongoing clinical
evaluation in several countries, in which case the methods
applied to H5N1 are reasonable strategies in vaccine re-
search [50,51].
Both Kawaoka and Fouchier have commented on the
significance of their work. Kawaoka is concerned to have
some public health means of responding to an H5N1
pandemic [52]. Although H5N1 has “limited viral repli-
cation” traits, Kawaoka’s own research makes it clear
that, “the factors that determine the interspecies trans-
mission and pathogenicity of influenza viruses are still
poorly understood” [53]. Further, Kawaoka’s research
team reports, “an anatomical difference in the distri-
bution in the human airway of the different binding
molecules preferred by the avian and human influenza
viruses,” which findings “may provide a rational expla-
nation for why H5N1 viruses at present rarely infect and
spread between humans although they can replicate effi-
ciently in the lungs” [54].
Despite the 60-day moratorium on current research,
Kawaoka argued for transmission studies such as his
“with urgency,” given that “not all H5 HA-possessing vi-
ruses are lethal” [55]. That is a fact in favor of continued
research, especially since in ferrets, the “mutant H5 HA/
2009 virus was no more pathogenic than the pandemic
2009 virus—it did not kill any of the infected animals.
And, importantly, current vaccines and antiviral com-
pounds are effective against it.” Kawaoka rejected the
NSABB risk assessment claims, countering that “H5N1
viruses circulating in nature already pose a threat, be-
cause influenza viruses mutate constantly and can cause
pandemics with great losses of life… Because H5N1 mu-
tations that confer transmissibility in mammals may
emerge in nature,” Kawaoka opines that “it would beirresponsible not to study the underlying mechanisms”
[55]. Kawaoka presented an argument, which may be
structured thus:
 There is an urgent need to expand development,
production and distribution of vaccines against H5
viruses, and to stockpile antiviral compounds.
 Both studies [Fouchier’s and Kawaoka’s] identify
specific mutations in HA that confer transmissibility
in ferrets to H5 HA-possessing viruses.
 A subset of these mutations has been detected in
H5N1 viruses circulating in certain countries.
 It is, therefore, imperative that these viruses are
monitored closely so that eradication efforts and
countermeasures (such as vaccine-strain selection)
can be focused on them, should they acquire
transmissibility.
 Consequently the benefits of these studies—the
knowledge that H5 HA-possessing viruses pose a
risk and the ability to monitor them and develop
countermeasures—outweigh the risks.
Such is Kawaoka’s counterargument to the NSABB
position. Fouchier similarly commented on his motiva-
tions, noting that, “highly respected virologists…thought
until a few years ago that H5N1 could never become
airborne between mammals.” Not convinced, Fouchier
decided “to make a virus that is transmissible” [56]. Fur-
ther, Fouchier argued for the ability to predict behavior
of the avian influenza virus, in the same way scientists
work to improve techniques predicting earthquakes and
tsunamis [57]. Fouchier believes that the results of such
research should be published in detail without redaction,
especially for those scientists responsible for influenza
surveillance in countries affected by H5N1 [58].
Fouchier is concerned with response preparedness: “If
those mutations would be detected in the field, then
those countries affected should act very aggressively to
stamp out the outbreaks, to protect the world.” Thus,
Fouchier hopes to prevent a pandemic, having a “last re-
source” in antiviral drugs and vaccines [58]. As for the
dual use implications, Fouchier recognizes that bio-terror
or bio-warfare can be a problem, but he also believes
using the H5N1 mutant virus is much too difficult—“there
are so many easy ways of doing it that nobody would take
this H5N1 virus and do this very difficult thing to achieve
it. There are terrorist opportunities that are much, much
easier than to genetically modify H5N1 bird flu virus that
are probably much more effective.” Fouchier also con-
trasts risk assessment as measured by biosecurity experts
and public health officials: “The only people who want to
hold back [on this research] are the biosecurity experts.
They show zero tolerance to risk. The public health spe-
cialists do not have this zero tolerance…” For Fouchier,
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most importance, even more so than the mutationsb [33].
Given the institutional approvals of the initial research
protocol, and given the current stage of research results,
Fouchier argues that, “detailed knowledge” of research
results is required “to ensure implementation of the
most up-to-date molecular diagnostics and virus genome
sequence interpretation” [59]. Further, Fouchier claims,
“Companies and research organizations with research
and development programs aiming at the development
of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral drugs for
H5N1 virus need to know if the effectiveness of such
tools depends on the virus lineage or specific mutations.”
Moreover, Fouchier adds, “research laboratories that
study H5N1 virus host adaptation, H5N1 virus in mam-
malian model systems, or use the same virus lineage that
was the subject of our studies have a need to know be-
cause they may unknowingly develop high-risk variants.”
Fouchier makes it clear that this is not merely hypo-
thetical, given the fact of laboratories working with
H5N1 viruses that may require only “one to three muta-
tions before the viruses used may become transmissible
via aerosols” [59]. Given these “need to know” claims,
Fouchier’s team is therefore unequivocal: “We do not
agree with the NSABB recommendations.”
Others involved in research with pathogens have pro-
vided their own arguments in this debate. Peter Palese’s
research in the 1990s led to the reconstruction of a “live
virus” version of the 1918 flu virus, which also entailed
NSABB review but moved forward with full publication
[60]. Palese argued in present case against censorship, by
comparison to the consequences of publication of his re-
search in 2005, which in his case turned out not to have
the consequence of a “nefarious scientist” recreating a
Spanish flu bioweapon. Notwithstanding, the question
has been raised whether such research should have been
undertaken in the first place with the claim that in this
case the risks outweigh the benefits [61-63].
Michael Osterholm, an epidemiologist who is a mem-
ber of the NSABB, argued against disclosure because of
the bioterrorist potential. The problem for him is not a
single instance of bioweapon use but instead what he
calls the “echo impact”—“where the illnesses may occur
for weeks after the initial hit… [and] where the transmis-
sion can occur from [one] generation to another” [64].
Despite his epidemiological expertise, and in contrast to
other public health opinions, Osterholm argued for zero
tolerance in this case [65]. Osterholm provided his argu-
ment through a series of hypothetical propositions with
his conclusion, which can be structured thus:
 If this virus does readily transmit between
humans, just as it’s now doing between ferrets,
which, to date have been the best animal modelwe have for predicting its performance or
behavior in humans; and,
 If in fact, this virus is as lethal in humans as it is in
ferrets;
 Then: this would be as serious an infectious disease
encounter that the human population has ever
known…
 So we cannot afford to be even a little bit wrong
here. Further,
 If we make a mistake, the virus either gets out
accidentally or it is, in fact, developed by someone
who has a nefarious purpose in mind, obviously we
haven’t done our job.
More recently, consequent to NSABB’s decision to pub-
lish the two manuscripts without redaction, Osterholm
wrote with continued objection [66]. He voted against full
disclosure of methods and results in the Fouchier paper,
concerned as he is that the revised manuscripts “are im-
mediately and directly enabling” of replication. Added to
his concern is his report that Fouchier “has already identi-
fied an additional mutation (not included in his current
manuscript) that results in ferret-to-ferret transmission
(mammalian transmission) without the need for repeated
passage of the virus in ferrets.” Further, given his lab’s
research on H1N1, which, he notes, recurred in 1977 after
a 20-year absence from global circulation, Osterholm
opines, “we are convinced [H1N1] leaked out of a Russian
lab that was working on a live-attenuated H1N1 virus
vaccine” [66]. The implication is that there is the same
probability of accidental release of H5N1-Mut through
prospective replication of Fouchier’s research.
Engaging the moral issue of research design
The foregoing represents the contour of the debate on
various points of concern. Commenting on “oversight,
biosafety, and biosecurity,” Fouchier’s research team
continues to remind that its work has been done “com-
pletely openly” following “local, national, and interna-
tional consultation.” This included consultations with
biosafety officers, facility managers, and virologists oper-
ating class 3 and class 4 facilities [58]. In addition to US
Department of Health and Human Services review and a
National Institutes of Health funding award, Fouchier’s
team reported it was granted “an explicit permit to work
with aerosol-transmissible H5N1 virus” from the Dutch
Ministry for Infrastructure and Environment in 2007, in-
cluding as part of that permit regulatory review from the
Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM), the
latter concluding that “the proposed work could be per-
formed with negligible risk to humans and the environ-
ment under the conditions outlined in the application.”
Fouchier’s facility is further inspected by the U.S. Cen-
ters for Disease Control, with the most recent inspection
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shortcomings in biosafety and biosecurity measures were
identified.”
Thus, Fouchier’s team points to the normative ques-
tion at issue here, and calls for a framework of reason-
ing, thus:
 First, there is a scientific question at issue here that
is posed by the scientific and biosecurity specialists
involved in this dispute: If by some means,
accidental or nefarious, the H5N1 laboratory
mutated virus (H5N1-Mut) is released into the
natural environment, how will H5N1-Mut virus
behave in the natural environment? This question, q,
we shall refer to as our “puzzle predicament, p.”
This question is a matter of scientific prediction,
itself dependent on an assortment of empirical
variables.
 Second, one may set forth a guiding proposition: If
one has a puzzle-predicament p, given q, then one no
longer has p when one has a correct answer, A, to q.
But, logically, “Any answer not known to be false
will do, even if not known to be true” [67].
Thus, we have at least two answers to the scientific
question to consider:
 A1: H5N1-Mut will behave in humans with the
same lethal pathogenicity it manifests in ferrets
maintained under laboratory conditions in the
Fouchier lab.
 A2: H5N1-Mut will not behave in humans with the
same lethal pathogenicity it manifests in ferrets
maintained under laboratory conditions in the
Fouchier lab.
As of current date, each of the two above answers is
not known to be false, even as neither is known to be
true. Thus, the truth-value of each proposition is not
known.
Epistemologically, this latter claim is different from the
claim that the truth-value of each proposition is un-
decidable. Accordingly, one may reasonably ask whether
there is some means by which we have evidence one
way or the other to decide the truth-value of either A1
or A2 and so have a correct answer to our puzzle-
predicament, p. Since we are engaged by empirical ques-
tions and expect empirically supported evidence, a
correct answer will be only inductively probable and not
certain. In short, given our present state of ignorance,
the scientists involved in the H5N1-Mut debate would
have to consider the question: “what methods for carry-
ing out vicarious investigations are offered?” We must
bear in mind that this latter question is reasonably posedonly on the assumption that the truth-value of A1 or A2
is decidable through the presentation of some kind of
empirical evidence. Our task here is, at the least, to
eliminate (if not eradicate) our ignorance concerning the
answer to our question, q.
Sylvain Bromberger characterizes a “rational ignor-
amus” as someone who “must deliberately select from
his ignorance at time t one question for elimination,” in
which case it is presupposed this person “must be able
to survey the membership of his ignorance” and, there-
by, “establish his preferences” as to the questions to be
eliminated. The scientists debating the prospective be-
havior of H5N1-Mut are, in effect, stipulating either A1
or A2 as the primary answers of interest, consistent with
their given attitude towards risk assessment—which is
either wholly risk intolerant (some biosafety experts such
as Osterholm, Keim, and Henderson) or risk tolerant to
a degree (some public health officials, principal investi-
gators such as Fouchier and Kawaoka, and other scien-
tists such as Palese and Racaniello). We can only assume
(rather than know) these scientists are able to determine
the truth-conditions for A1 and A2, i.e., what else em-
pirically must be true (or reasonably probably true) if A1
is true or, alternatively, if A2 is true.
For the time being, clearly, we need not concern our-
selves with every possible answer to our question, q.
What matters to the scientific community and to the
public interest at this time is an answer to q stated as ei-
ther A1 or A2. And, either answer will (or should) in-
volve evidence “strong enough to warrant the belief that
one knows the answer” to be A1 or A2 [67]. That is to
say, for both A1 and A2 one must reasonably have a set
of justified true beliefs to accept either A1 or A2 as a
correct answer to q. Justified true beliefs include having
reasons for or against the continued pursuit of this re-
search, even as such reasons should have been in place
at the outset when this research was first authorized.
Following an analytical scheme presented in the work of
philosopher Derek Parfit, it may be said that these rea-
sons can be decisive, even strongly decisive, in relation to
the options of proceeding with or foregoing this kind of
research [68].
Individuals, including scientists, can have both true be-
liefs and false beliefs, either or both of which (severally
or jointly) may be articulated as reasons for or against
various actions. Scientists may have justification or war-
rant for their true beliefs. They may even provide what
is purported to be justification or warrant for what, un-
known to them, are false beliefs. An influenza virologist,
for example, may believe that (A) the H5N1-Mut virus,
if released into the natural environment (whether through
accident or nefarious means), will have the same pa-
thogenicity manifest in the ferret model in the event of
aerosol transmission of this virus among humans; and,
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aerosol transmission and high virulence of H5N1-Mut in
humans will result in a pandemic of H5N1 influenza with
a mortality rate far exceeding that of the 1918 influenza
pandemic. Such are likely to be the beliefs of one such as
Osterholm. But, one would have to ask what it means to
have such beliefs, i.e., beliefs about predictions that are
dependent on any number of hypotheses and empirical
variables, in contrast to having a belief about a fact that is
already inductively warranted and which has reliable em-
pirical grounding. How does one test such a prediction if
it is to be a guide to decision-making that has public
health and science policy consequences?
A philosopher such as W. V. O. Quine would argue
that, “Testing a given empirical prediction to the satis-
faction of the scientific community requires only that
there be a sufficient context of shared background as-
sumptions to provide the rules for the empirical test”
[68]. But, in the case of H5N1-Mut research we have no
international consensus as to the background assump-
tions or rules for empirical testing. Regarding evidence
of H5N1-Mut pathogenicity and efficiency of transmis-
sion, we have only in vivo data from the ferret models
used by Fouchier and Kawaoka, combined with ques-
tionable serological surveillance data and debated hu-
man case-fatality data, to inform us about a plausible
empirical test, on the basis of which inferences to pro-
spectively probable human transmission may then be
made. But, the level of ambiguity—and even disagree-
ment—about probability are thereby wholly problematic,
almost to the point of total ignorance.
If one’s epistemological situation is one of ignorance
concerning a future event (i.e., one simply does not know
either A or B above, although one believes by way of hy-
pothesis that either A or B), then what a scientist should
or should not do, as a matter of morally warranted re-
search integrity, reasonably comes into normative conflict
in relation to an epistemic state. That is, this normative
conflict in this case is entirely likely to be articulated as a
conflict among the scientists having differing beliefs about
the hypothesized future events A and B. This is clearly evi-
dent now among influenza virologists and biosafety ex-
perts (the latter including infectious disease specialists),
who differ in the strength of their convictions on the an-
swer to a question involving a prediction about the patho-
genicity and transmissibility of H5N1-Mut in humans.
Thus, we are faced with a central epistemological ques-
tion, the answer to which is a presupposition to the
ongoing debate about the science involved: Does the prop-
osition representing a prediction, in and of itself, have
truth-value? That is, is it decidable whether this propo-
sition represents a true belief rather than a false belief?
One may surely argue that A and B propositions
stated above are both possible empirical outcomes, butthat neither A nor B is a necessary empirical outcome.
That is, A or B is each contingent on any number of
variables that can make one or the other proposition
more or less probably true or more or less probably false
but not necessarily/apodictically true or false. Depending
on one’s theory of truth, one may even go so far as to
argue that A and B do not have truth-value at all when
proposed, but that instead they have only a probability-
value intermediate between truth (value T = 1) and
falsehood (value F = 0), with (T = 1) and (F = 0) being in-
clusive as prospective empirical outcomes [69]. A value <1
then “signifies objective chance” such that, “If ‘1’ means
‘known’, [then] a value short of 1 signifies a degree of
(subjective) credence or epistemic support.” But, even
then, one would have to consider the presumed sym-
metry of intuitions operative here, according to which
one individual reasonably prefers to think the predictive
proposition to be neither true nor false while another’s
intuition is that the predictive proposition is either true
or false [70]. MacFarlane has argued that, “an adequate
account of future contingents must respect both these
intuitions;” and, further, “in order to make good sense
of future contingents, we must allow the truth of utter-
ances to be relativized to the context from which they
are being assessed” [71]. Thus, it is coherent to say, “an
utterance is true [false] with respect to a context of
assessment a iff the sentence uttered is true [false] with
respect to a context of utterance and a [context of as-
sessment]” [71].
Consider, by way of illustration: If one says predict-
ively, ‘tomorrow will be the end of the world’, and one
believes ‘tomorrow will be the end of the world’ to be
true today because one believes ‘tomorrow will prove the
proposition true’, then one can say these are two beliefs
which indeed one truly holds. But, these are not there-
fore also beliefs one knows (infallibly) to be true; nor are
these beliefs which one can expect others to hold to be
true merely because one holds these beliefs (assuming
no fallacy of appeal to authority in this case). It can be a
fact that one truly holds the two beliefs; but this fact in
and of itself does not entail the yet-to-be-demonstrated
claim that ‘tomorrow will be the end of the world’. By
parity of reasoning, then, one would have to say the
same in the case of predictive argument (beliefs) con-
cerning the pathogenicity and transmissibility of H5N1-
Mut once released into the natural environment. It is a
fact that biosafety experts truly hold the belief (A) that
H5N1-Mut, if accidentally or nefariously released into
the environment, will have the same efficiency of trans-
mission and the same pathogenicity in humans as that
observed in ferrets. But, the fact of biosafety experts
having this belief, in and of itself, does not entail the yet-
to-be-demonstrated fact that, H5N1-Mut, if accidentally
or nefariously released into the environment, will have
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genicity in humans as that observed in ferrets. And, of
course, it is precisely this prospective fact that all do not
want to see demonstrated, no matter the prediction.
Suppose we take both Osterholm (et. al.) and Fouchier
(et. al.) as utilitarians faced with the decision whether
(1) to publish with redaction (such as NSABB proposed)
or (2) to publish with full disclosure (such as Fouchier
preferred). The former finds full publication a severe dis-
utility, due to the prospect of accidental release and/or
nefarious use of H5N1-Mut consequent to replication of
the research. The latter finds full publication a signi-
ficant utility, due to the prospect of improvements in
knowledge in avian influenza virology and epidemiolo-
gical surveillance associated with mutation of H5N1Wt,
etc., based on what one may learn from continued re-
search with H5N1-Mut. The issue here is first of all epi-
stemic, and then, secondly, ethical. That is, one may be
concerned reasonably to evaluate the rationality of the
beliefs held by Osterholm and Fouchier, associated as
these beliefs are with the two outcomes being debated,
whatever the reliability of the predictions and the epi-
stemic value of those predictions. One may thereafter be
concerned to evaluate the ethical judgment and pro-
posed morally warranted action that are consequents of
the beliefs held. If we are to consider the beliefs rational,
we expect that each scientist has either an implicit or ex-
plicit commitment to a probability measure of outcome
predicted, although it is unclear whether that measure is
quantitative or qualitative. NSABB’s position fails to dis-
close both the basis and the analysis of risk/benefit and
merely expects the public at large to accept this on au-
thority, which is unacceptable in a matter such as this
one affecting the public interest.
Each of the probability measures (whatever they may
be) is related to a belief that Osterholm holds and a be-
lief that Fouchier holds. We do not say these beliefs are
irrational, given the analyses of utility and disutility each
has identified, as partially surveyed in the representation
of the (public) debate heretofore. But, surely, one may
expect that one of these two positions is dominant by
some measure of maximal expected utility. Fouchier
surely holds that it is rational for him to conduct the re-
search in a BSL-3 facility if he believes (as he does) that
there is a probability of an accidental release of H5N1-
Mut even as he allows for a probability of nefarious use
consequent to a full disclosure of the research in an
open access publication venue. But, in his case, Fouchier
finds the maximal expected utility in continuing the re-
search with open disclosure, rather than in continued re-
search with redacted disclosure. Osterholm, in contrast,
surely holds that it is rational for Fouchier and Kawaoka
to conduct the research in a BSL-3 facility if he believes
(as he does) that there is a probability of an accidentalrelease of H5N1-Mut even as he allows for a probability
of nefarious use consequent to full disclosure of the re-
search in an open access publication venue. But, in his
case, Osterholm finds the maximal expected utility in
continuing the research but, if and only if there is
redacted disclosure of the research methods. Osterholm
is less concerned with the prospect of accidental release
than he is with nefarious use, in which case his probabil-
ity measure would have to weigh the former lower than
the latter.
Applying Parfit’s argument
Clearly, with the utilitarian/consequentialist approach to
estimation of risk/benefit, we find ourselves in a con-
tinuing conundrum, without resolution of the debate in
favor of either redacted disclosure such as NSABB re-
commended or open disclosure such as the influenza vi-
rologists preferred. Some other analytical approach is,
therefore, in order. NSABB authorities would have con-
tributed immensely to resolution of the debate more effi-
ciently had they disclosed the basis of their risk/benefit
analysis. All would likely benefit from an epistemic util-
ity analysis that has quantitative methods in use adding
to qualitative analysis. This is not the place for this exer-
cise, especially in the absence of the data available to
NSABB review. Instead, I turn to the philosopher Parfit
to engage the epistemic question differently.
Following Parfit, we can say that acting on the basis of
a true belief is rational; acting on the basis of a false be-
lief is irrational. Such action presupposes one having
practical reasons. One may, indeed, say that sometimes
individuals (including otherwise competent scientists
whose research integrity is by no means to be impugned)
act on the basis of false beliefs. But, logically (according
to Parfit), “if we say that false beliefs can give people rea-
sons, we would need to add that these reasons do not
have any normative force, in the sense that they do not
count in favour of any act. And, we would have to ignore
such reasons when we are trying to decide what some-
one has most reason to do” [68]. But, Parfit prefers in-
stead that we distinguish apparent reasons from real
reasons, in which case we would say that “all reasons
have normative force;” and, further, “When we give people
advice, we can ignore the merely apparent reasons that
are provided by these people’s false beliefs.”
Following Parfit, then, in the case of virologists’ pre-
diction of H5N1-Mut behavior in the natural envi-
ronment, one would thus have to distinguish apparent
reasons and real reasons, ignoring the apparent reasons
when having to decide, e.g., whether to recommend con-
tinuation of H5N1-Mut research. This is an important
point, because, as Barrett and Stanford say, “our predict-
ive language has continuously respected the fundamental
idea that a prediction is a claim about unknown matters
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pendently ascertained by some more direct method than
that used to make the prediction itself” [69]. Thus, pre-
diction is “inherently risky” and subject to refutation, gi-
ven the defeasible character of scientific reasoning—i.e.,
the introduction of new evidence subjects the prediction
to defeat and thus to elimination of the warrant it sup-
posedly had.
Such risk must be evaluated in terms of its epistemo-
logical character. Parfit argues that individuals “might be
practically rational but epistemologically irrational, or
practically irrational but epistemologically rational” [68].
The scientific question at issue for both the virologists
and the biosafety experts is not merely one of epistemic
rationality (which, Parfit says, has “the aim of reaching
true beliefs”). Instead, it is one of practical rationality,
i.e., the aim is that of doing something, something that
is hopefully correct. The influenza virologists are hard at
work on H5N1Wt and, now, H5N1-Mut for both epi-
stemic reasons (e.g., to know the molecular and bio-
logical variables associated with the virus) even as they
have practical reasons for pursuing this research (e.g.,
working out pathogenesis and host response for the
practical public health goals of improved influenza sur-
veillance and prospectively successful R&D in vaccine
and antiviral therapy).
If we take the NSABB recommendation to redact the
journal articles to avoid disclosure of research methods
(based on NSABB’s concern about prospective nefarious
dual-use consequences of the research at issue), then we
could say (as Parfit does): “…acts are best called ir-
rational only when, in…acting in some way, we are fai-
ling to respond to clear and strongly decisive practical
reasons or apparent reasons not to…act in this way”
[68]. Thus, we have here a main point of argument, to
be structured thus:
 Fouchier’s or Kawaoka’s continuation of their research
or full disclosure of their research methods and results
would properly be called irrational only when, in doing
so, Fouchier and Kawaoka fail to respond to clear and
strongly decisive practical reasons not to pursue that
research or not to publish fully.
 Given the survey of dispute reviewed in the first two
sections of this paper, one may reasonably assert
that it is not the case that either scientist, Fouchier or
Kawaoka, has clear and strongly decisive practical
reasons presented to them by NSABB or any other
public health or biosecurity authority for not
pursuing their research.
 Hence, neither Fouchier nor Kawaoka can be
characterized as irrational in deciding to continue
their research endeavor or in deciding to publish
their research in full detail.On the other hand, if we take Paul Keim’s assertion
that the probability of nefarious use of the H5N1-Mut
virus is low, we might still ask whether this low probabil-
ity (assuming it to be correct) is to be reasonably ig-
nored. In “consequentialist terms,” Parfit has remarked,
“When I cannot predict the effects of my act, [conse-
quentialism] tells me to do whatever would produce the
greatest expected benefit. The expected benefit of my act
is the possible benefit multiplied by the chance that my
act will produce it” [72]. The “possible benefit” in this
case is (Benefit 1) no nefarious release of H5N1-Mut
into the natural environment and, consequently, (Benefit
2) no evolutionary reassortment of the virus to the detri-
ment of global public health through an H5N1-Mut pan-
demic. Multiply this possible benefit by the probability
that (a) full disclosure of the Fouchier and Kawaoka re-
search methods is prohibited, and (b) replication and
validation of these research results are thereby also
prevented. One must then ask: Will the consequence(s)
of these two proposed actions represent the achievement
of the expected benefit? That is, will the consequences
be substantively positive, rather than negative, in the cal-
culation (accounting here for the virologists’ contribu-
tion as defined by the practical reasons motivating their
research)?
To answer the question, one may draw a comparison
here. Parfit [72] illustrates the point with this example:
“Suppose that nuclear engineers did ignore all chances
at or below the threshold of one-in-a-million. It might
then be the case that, for each of the many components
in a nuclear reactor, there is a one-in-a-million chance
that, in any day, this component would fail in a way that
would cause a catastrophe. It would be clearly wrong for
those who design reactors to ignore such tiny chances. If
there are many reactors, each with many such compo-
nents, it would not take many days before the one-in-a-
million risk had been run a million times. There would
fairly soon be a catastrophe.” Thus, Parfit asserts: “When
the stakes are very high, no chance, however small,
should be ignored… We can usually ignore a very small
chance. But we should not do so when we may affect a
very large number of people, or when the chance will be
taken in a very large number of times. These large num-
bers roughly cancel out the smallness of the chance.”
The question of chance here, in the case of avian influ-
enza virology, requires some reference to the evolution-
ary biology associated with virus mutation. One may
consider here that evolutionary biology treats the pro-
cess of mutation as “a random variable…either because
it is genuinely indeterminate or because we don’t know
yet enough about the process or relevant conditions in
particular organisms to predict what, when and how par-
ticular mutations will occur with any precision” [73]. In
present case of H5N1Wt naturally mutating to the
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H5N1-Mut, we may or may not now know enough (con-
sequent to the Fouchier and Kawaoka experiments)
about either the process or the conditions in H5N1Wt to
predict when and how this strain will reassort naturally
for H5N1-Mut to start showing up internationally in
sero-epidemiological surveillance. If the mutation were
to occur naturally and sero-epidemiological evidence
began to show this, there is little doubt that a large
number of people would be affected, hence the problem
of a high-mortality pandemic in the absence of cross-
protective immunity from other influenza infections.
It is this “chance” that the NSABB panel has argued
we cannot take. However, as long as the research with
H5N1-Mut is restricted to BSL-3 labs, the chance of ac-
cidental release will not be taken a very large number of
times (in terms of the number of BSL-3 facilities world-
wide having the capacity or agenda for such research), in
which case this low probability provides some guidance
for at least a regulatory decision that, at minimum, such
research should have adequate oversight to assure its re-
striction to BSL-3 facilities. Such restriction clearly does
not dismiss the probability of accidental release, al-
though in the case of these facilities the probability is
quite low so as to overcome an argument against contin-
ued research. The only “chance” concern, then, is the
probability of natural evolution of H5N1Wt to an aero-
sol transmissible strain. But, if the concern is less with
accidental release or nefarious use of H5N1-Mut and
more with this probable evolution of H5N1-Wt to an
aerosol transmissible strain, then we have additional rea-
son to permit ongoing H5N1-Mut research for all the
reasons already specified by Fouchier and Kawaoka. Ig-
norance is far more risky than study of these variables
and unknowns under the regulatory conditions now in
place for BSL-3 facilities.
Those involved in future studies have held that “the na-
ture of predictive arguments is evidential” rather than de-
monstrative [74]. Further, the logic of prediction is
different from that of explanation. Empirical adequacy, for
example, in Bas Van Fraasen’s sense, requires that future
observable consequences be true even as past and present
observable consequences are true [75]. Yet, this is surely
problematic for most fields of scientific research, including
in present case predictive claims in microbiology and vir-
ology concerning the pathogenicity and transmissibility of
a given pathogen, such as predictive claims now at issue
in the H5N1-Mut debate. In the present debate there is a
need for caution and restraint in merely deferring to the
professional authority of either the influenza scientists or
the biosecurity experts, if only because “the increased de-
mand for policy-relevant scientific prediction has not been
accompanied by adequate understanding of the appro-
priate use of prediction in policy making” [76].Conclusion
NSABB reported that it had calculated risks and benefits
associated with full disclosure of the H5N1-Mut re-
search. In this sense, NSABB authorities have been utili-
tarian/consequentialist in their analyses. However, it is
problematic, to say the least, that NSABB has done so
without disclosing those details to the public at large,
which diminishes the authority of its assessment in the
absence of appropriate public validation. Such calcu-
lations are more likely to be qualitative rather than
quantitative (even allowing for statistical sophistication
provided by epidemiological methods). This is why one
has to be concerned about both empirical adequacy and
reliability of such risk/benefit claims, such as discussed
in the preceding section. In H5N1 laboratory research
and in associated influenza field surveillance, we do not
have invariant phenomena that are being explained, and
which stand in a relation of consistent observations to
consistently validated predictions. Instead, prediction
here must account for the variant behavior of pathogens
according to any number of variables not readily con-
trolled, e.g., the naturally occurring mutation of a virus
(e.g., H5N1-Wt naturally evolving to the lab-equivalent
H5N1-Mut) in a particular reservoir (avian species), this
virus then adapting to (or expanding) its host range (e.g.,
from avian species to mammals) in a particular geo-
graphic setting (Indonesia, Bangladesh, China, etc.).
Given the qualitative/quantitative distinction in rela-
tion to calculation of risk/benefit, the NSABB position
about the Fouchier and Kawaoka experiments is a case
in point of what Sarewitz and Pielke, Jr., have recognized
to be “the political role” associated with scientific predic-
tion. This role is characteristically “seductive,”: “If pre-
dictive science can improve policy outcomes by guiding
policy choices,” Sarewitz and Pielke, Jr. opine, “then it
can as well reduce the need for divisive debate and con-
tentious decision-making based on subjective values and
interests. Prediction, that is, can become a substitute for
political and moral discourse” [76]. What the NSABB
debate in this case makes clear is that, reduction of de-
bate, however, is an unacceptable outcome precisely be-
cause it a priori privileges the authority of “the scientific
estate” to the detriment of a strong relation of ethics and
science policy that should not be eliminated, precisely be-
cause of the need for reasonable moral governance amidst
the growing complexity of scientific research, a complexity
that includes ambiguous and contested epistemic states of
the scientists involved. It behooves the public at large to
maintain vigilance of the fact that there are limits to ex-
pert knowledge, including that of epidemiologists, influ-
enza virologists, and biosecurity analysts. One should not
merely defer a priori to scientific authority [77]. The pub-
lic interest requires informed contribution from those
who advocate for that interest as one of concern for the
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Here, with the assessment carried out in the discussion of
this analysis, the recommendation is clear: Given an epis-
temological assessment in relation to a moral assessment
where facts, predictions, and moral standards are taken
into account, neither Fouchier nor Kawaoka can be char-
acterized as irrational in deciding to continue their re-
search endeavor or in deciding to publish their research in
full detail. In this case, there is moral warrant in place rea-
sonably to permit genetic alteration of the H5N1 strain of
avian influenza for the purposes presented in the research
protocol.
Of course, the contrary argument can be made, insofar
as a position such as that of Osterholm is advanced as
likewise not irrational (according to the structure of rea-
soning provided by Parfit), given our epistemological
position in relation to known and unknown facts and
variables. However, the standard of open research must
be faced with considerable empirical and/or moral argu-
ment against it, to counter the validity of the standard of
open disclosure, even in the case of H5N1-Mut research.
Neither empirical nor moral argument (as surveyed hith-
erto) is sufficiently countervailing to defeat the validity
of this standard for this type of research. Moreover, in
the absence of reliable, more or less universalist, forms
of argument, and given the possibilities in research out-
come that are at issue in this research, permissibility ra-
ther than prohibition seems the weightier option (as
would be clear even with a probabilist type of reasoning
such as is delivered in casuistry’s attention to licit, rather
than illicit, action, and such as may be issued in a rigor-
ous epistemic utility analysis that NSABB authorities
could have produced in defense of their recommenda-
tions). Hence, the final decision to permit full disclosure
and publication of the Fouchier and Kawaoka papers is
consistent with the analysis presented here.
Endnotes
a“Fouchier and colleagues used a combination ap-
proach, engineering the virus and then stepping back to
let nature take its course. They introduced key muta-
tions into H5N1’s genetic code and then infected the
ferrets…Typically…this is done by placing the virus in
ferret noses, waiting a few days, swabbing out some mu-
cous, infecting another ferret with it, and repeating the
process over and over. Throughout the process, infected
and uininfected ferrets would be placed in adjacent
cages to see whether the virus could pass from one ani-
mal to the other without them touching… [Just] five
tweaks in two genes, followed by just 10 passages of
the virus between ferrets, created a pathogen that
could travel through the air from animal to animal. The
virus remained lethal.” (Brown, Los Angeles Times, 26
December 2011).bFouchier speaks of the virus being attracted to the
upper respiratory tract rather than in the lung; whether
the virus binds to certain mammalian receptors; whether
it has to reproduce in large amounts to increase chance
of transmission; whether it has to be stable in small
droplets; etc., all of which variables vary yet further with
“more possible mutations.” For technical comments, see
E.M. Sorrell [62]. Moreover, Fouchier has worked with
only one genetic lineage of H5N1, in which case: “The
question is whether all lineages can become aerosol-
transmissible. If they can’t, if it’s just this lineage, per-
haps you can focus on the region where it came from
and try to stop H5N1 outbreaks there to prevent a pan-
demic. If it can happen everywhere, you’ve got to work
everywhere.”
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